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BANK RELATIONSHIPS AND BORROWING COSTS*




Firms may beneﬁ  t from engaging in exclusive and lasting relationships with banks. Through these 
lending relationships, banks obtain important soft information regarding ﬁ  rms’ performance, organi-
zation and strategy, which would be very hard to obtain otherwise. This information can be reﬂ  ected 
in better funding conditions for ﬁ  rms, either through improved accessibility to credit or through better 
price conditions. However, ﬁ  rms may also be harmed by these relationships. For instance, banks can 
initially offer good conditions to attract customers, but once they are locked in the relationship banks 
may extract rents from these ﬁ  rms. There is a large theoretical and empirical literature debating the 
costs and beneﬁ  ts of relationship banking.1
In this article, we address a speciﬁ  c issue in this literature: how does the number of bank relationships 
affect borrowing costs. Given the arguments outlined above, this effect can either be positive or ne-
gative. Moreover, the results obtained so far provide mixed evidence (Degryse, Kim and Ongena, 
2009).
Using a detailed dataset for Portuguese ﬁ  rms, we ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  rms usually borrow simultaneously from 
several banks, even if they are small ﬁ  rms. The larger ﬁ  rms are, the more bank relationships they 
usually hold. Furthermore, we ﬁ  nd that when ﬁ  rms increase the number of lenders, they beneﬁ  t from 
a signiﬁ  cant decrease in borrowing costs. This result is broadly valid regardless of ﬁ  rm size, except 
for the smallest ﬁ  rms in the sample. Moreover, the largest ﬁ  rms are those which beneﬁ  t more from 
engaging in multiple bank relationships. Instead of considering only the number of bank relationships, 
we also analyze the impact of the distribution of loan amounts amongst different banks. We ﬁ  nd that 
when ﬁ  rms concentrate their lending in fewer banks, their borrowing costs increase, what reinforces 
our previous ﬁ  ndings.
This article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present a brief review of the relevant literature. In 
Section 3 we describe the data used and in Section 4 we present some summary statistics. In Sec-
tion 5 we analyse our main econometric results. Finally, in Section 6 we present some concluding 
remarks.
(1)  For a recent and extensive survey, see Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009).
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Diamond’s (1984) classical delegated monitoring theory, in a setting of asymmetric 
information between ﬁ  rms and investors, the former should be better off when they borrow from only 
one bank. This result derives from the fact that single bank relationships decrease overall monitoring 
costs, which in turn generate lower borrowing costs. This theory was empirically tested by Petersen 
and Rajan (1994), who found that the existence of multiple lenders increases loan interest rates and 
broadly reduces the availability of credit.
However, other empirical works ﬁ  nd that ﬁ  rms rarely keep exclusive bank relationships. For exam-
ple, Ongena and Smith (2000), in a survey including 1079 ﬁ  rms across 20 European countries, ﬁ  nd 
that the majority of ﬁ  rms (85 per cent) borrow from more than one bank. These authors observe that 
ﬁ  rms usually maintain more bank relationships in countries with inefﬁ  cient judicial systems and poor 
enforcement of creditor rights. D’Auria, Foglia and Reedtz (1999) obtain similar results for Italy. In our 
dataset we also ﬁ  nd that the majority of Portuguese ﬁ  rms, including micro ﬁ  rms, borrow from several 
banks.
There are many theories attempting to provide an explanation for why ﬁ  rms may prefer to borrow 
from several different banks. According to Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992), in an exclusive bank 
relationship, the informationally privileged bank might exploit its bargaining power over the ﬁ  rm and 
extract rents from loan contracts. This implies that micro and small ﬁ  rms with a unique lender should 
face higher borrowing costs. In turn, Berger and Udell (1998) argue that the refusal of credit from the 
ﬁ  rm’s only lender may send a negative signal to the market, thus making exclusive bank relationships 
undesirable. Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) show that ﬁ  rms borrowing from less fragile 
banks are more likely to engage into multiple bank relationships. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) con-
sider that multiple bank relationships might prevent the ﬁ  rm manager from strategic defaulting by 
holding up the renegotiation process. Furthermore, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997), and Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung (2007) predict that multiple bank relationships will 
be more likely when banks face ﬁ  nancial constraints or monitoring costs. Carletti et al. (2007) also 
suggest that multiple bank relationships allow banks to diversify their lending risk. They predict that 
banks are more attracted to multiple-bank lending when the bank has lower equity, when the cost of 
monitoring is high, and when the proﬁ  tability of the ﬁ  rm is low. Moreover, in the face of ﬁ  erce com-
petition, multiple arms-length lending might substitute relationship lending as analyzed by Boot and 
Thakor (2000). These authors predict that bank competition should lead to lower interest rates and 
that ﬁ  rms will not commit to exclusive bank relationships. On the other hand, they argue that rela-
tionship lending might protect banks from price competition. Finally, in a recent paper, Ioannidou and 
Ongena (2010) show that when ﬁ  rms change banks they initially beneﬁ  t from lower interest rates. 
However, as time goes by, hold-up effects gradually emerge.Articles  |  Part II
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3. DATA 
We use two large datasets in this work. All information concerning the number of bank relationships 
comes from the Central Credit Register of Banco de Portugal. This extensive database includes infor-
mation on all credit exposures above 50 euros, reported monthly by all Portuguese credit institutions. 
The reporting is mandatory. The main objective of this database is to disseminate information among 
participating institutions in order to improve their credit risk assessment on current and potential 
borrowers. Participating banks can observe, for each borrower, the number of bank relationships 
this borrower has, the total outstanding debt, as well as the status of the loans. It is also possible to 
know whether credit has become overdue, if it was renegotiated or if it is an off-balance sheet risk, 
such as the unused part of a credit line or a bank guarantee. This database does not include any 
information regarding collateral and interest rates, and includes only partial information on individual 
loans maturities. 
We obtain information on the cost of borrowing from another large dataset: the Central Balance Sheet 
Database of Banco de Portugal. This database provides detailed yearly accounting information, in-
cluding ﬁ  rm age, economic sector, proﬁ  tability, leverage, etc., for a large sample of Portuguese ﬁ  rms. 
Reporting to the Central Balance Sheet Database was not compulsory during the sample period and, 
as a consequence, this database covers only a limited (but large) sample of Portuguese ﬁ  rms. The 
sample of ﬁ  rms covers to an acceptable degree the Portuguese universe, although some bias may 
exist towards larger ﬁ  rms, which are almost totally covered.
Using end of year data for the period comprised between 1996 and 2004, the Central Credit Register 
includes 3,990,802 records. Banks do not report information on a strict loan-by-loan basis, given that 
it is possible to aggregate loans granted to the same ﬁ  rm with similar status. We aggregate loans by 
ﬁ  rm, in order to count the number of bank relationships. Hence, each record is deﬁ  ned as a ﬁ  rm-year 
pair. Taking into account data for the same period of time, the Central Balance Sheet Database in-
cludes 202,364 records. Merging the two databases we obtain 154,682 common observations, com-
prising 38,342 ﬁ  rms.2 Even though both databases were created before 1996, the interest payments 
on bank loans of the Central Balance Sheet Database are available only from 1996 onward, cons-
training our sample to start in 1996. We analyze only lending relationships between ﬁ  rms and banks, 
excluding all lending relationships with non-monetary credit institutions, such as leasing companies.









where  it IP  are interest payments on bank loans and  it D is total debt to credit institutions of ﬁ  rm i. 
it r  is therefore the implicit interest rate of ﬁ  rm i at time t across all the ﬁ  rm’s bank loans. 
(2)  Not all observations in the Central Balance Sheet Database can be matched with the Credit Register because a substantial percentage of ﬁ  rms do not 
rely on bank credit, as discussed in Antão and Bonﬁ  m (2008).Part II  |  Articles
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Several ﬁ  lters were applied in order to guarantee a reasonable quality of the data used, even if at the 
cost of a lower number of observations. The ﬁ  rst step was to exclude all observations for which debt 
or interest paid was negative or equaled zero, given that it would not make sense to compute implicit 
interest rates in such cases. We also excluded all ﬁ  rms that had zero employees. Such ﬁ  rms should 
be mainly holding companies or ﬁ  rms in liquidation, though this may also reﬂ  ect isolated reporting 
problems in the database. Additionally, we dropped all observations below the 5th percentile and 
above the 95th percentile of the implicit interest rates distributions. In order to avoid results driven 
by outliers we also exclude all observations below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile 
of the distribution of each ﬁ  rm speciﬁ  c variable used in the regressions. Moreover, we dropped all 
observations for which the estimated implicit interest rate was below the interbank money market 
interest rate.
After these ﬁ  lters are applied, our ﬁ  nal dataset is an unbalanced panel data containing 42,263 obser-
vations, for 17,516 ﬁ  rms, between 1996 and 2004. Each ﬁ  rm has on average 2.4 years of data. Firms’ 
entries and exits from the sample are not strictly associated with ﬁ  rms’ creations and extinctions. 
They reﬂ  ect primarily the voluntary nature of the survey. If we consider only ﬁ  rms with two consecuti-
ve years of data and with information on all variables considered relevant for our analysis, we have a 
sample of 16,804 observations, covering 7,700 different ﬁ  rms. All summary statistics presented in the 
next section consider this restricted sample, which will be used for most of the regression analysis.
4. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Chart 1 shows the average, median, and weighted mean of our measure of interest rate against the 
aggregate interest rate on all outstanding loans to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations in Portugal disclosed 
by Banco de Portugal (Monetary and Financial Statistics). The weighted average of the interest rate 
Chart 1
IMPLICIT INTEREST RATE MEASURES
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The aggregate interest rate is the interest rate on outstanding 
amounts of loans to non-ﬁ  nancial corporations disclosed by Banco de Por-
tugal in its Monetary and Financial Statistics. This interest rate is a weighted 
average of interest rates reported by banks. Implicit interest rates were com-
puted as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total 
debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The weighted average of 
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appears to track the aggregate interest rate rather well. The decreasing interest rate during the 1990s 
reﬂ  ects the convergence and integration in the European Monetary Union and probably also changes 
in bank competition during the sample period.3
The upper panel of Chart 2 shows a histogram of the bank interest rate over the entire sample. In the 
lower panel of Chart 2 we present the histograms of the interest rate for each year in our sample. The 
distribution of interest rates across ﬁ  rms changed signiﬁ  cantly between 1997 and 2004. Whereas in 
the earlier years of the sample period interest rates showed an almost uniform distribution, exhibiting 
a large dispersion in borrowing costs across ﬁ  rms; in the latter years of the sample period the distri-
bution became closer to a log-normal. In these latter years, there was not only a decrease in average 
interest rates paid by ﬁ  rms, but also a substantial decline in their dispersion. As discussed in Antão 
et al. (2009), this lower dispersion results mainly from the decrease of interest rates for those ﬁ  rms 
with higher interest payments.
We observe that approximately one ﬁ  fth (18 per cent) of the ﬁ  rms hold one exclusive lending re-
lationship. Chart 3 shows that the average number of bank relationships did not vary signiﬁ  cantly 
over time, ranging between 3.3 and 3.7 across the sample period. The chart shows that the average 
number of bank relationships exhibits an increasing trend starting in 1998. The observed decrease 
in 2001 is probably due to the strong merger and acquisition activities during this period in the Por-
tuguese banking system.
Chart 4 shows that the number of lending relationships increases steadily with the ﬁ  rm age. Start-up 
ﬁ  rms have, on average, two or three lending relationships, whereas older ﬁ  rms hold a more diversi-
ﬁ  ed creditor structure. Furthermore, younger ﬁ  rms pay higher interest rates than do older ﬁ  rms, as 
expected. Farinha and Santos (2002), who also investigated the number of bank relationships in 
Portugal, observe that almost all ﬁ  rms start borrowing only from a single bank, but soon afterward 
diversify their creditor structure, most notably when growth opportunities are stronger.
Table 1 reports the distribution of the number of bank relationships together with the interest rate and 
proxies for ﬁ  rm size and maturity such as the number of employees and ﬁ  rm age. Columns 2 and 
3 show that ﬁ  rms with a single banking relationship pay a higher interest rate than ﬁ  rms with two or 
three relationships. Columns 4 to 7 suggest that the number of bank relationships is positively related 
to ﬁ  rm age and to the number of employees.
We construct a measure of ﬁ  rm size following a deﬁ  nition suggested by the European Commission 
that considers the number of employees and sales volumes to deﬁ  ne four different size categories: 
micro, small, medium and large.4 We end up with 3,780 micro, 7,836 small, 4,204 medium and 984 
large ﬁ  rms. Table 2 displays the number of bank relationships and the interest rate for these four 
categories. On average, micro and small ﬁ  rms hold, respectively, two and three bank relationships, 
medium-sized ﬁ  rms borrow from more than four banks, while larger ﬁ  rms have more than six different 
(3)  An analysis of competition in the Portuguese banking market in this period may be found in Boucinha and Ribeiro (2009).
(4)  More precisely, in the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC) micro ﬁ  rms are deﬁ  ned as those with fewer than 10 em-
ployees and less than 2 million euro of business volume; small ﬁ  rms are those with fewer than 50 employees and less than 10 million euro of business 
volume; medium ﬁ  rms are those with fewer than 250 employees and a business volume below 50 million euros. All remaining ﬁ  rms are considered to be 
large ﬁ  rms.Part II  |  Articles
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Chart 2






















































Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Note: Empirical distribution of the implicit interest rate on bank loans, computed as interest paid to banks as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions 
for each ﬁ  rm.
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bank relationships. Table 2 also shows that the interest rate decreases with the ﬁ  rm size.
To conclude our descriptive analysis, we perform mean comparison tests to evaluate if interest rates 
are statistically different for ﬁ  rms with many relationships (above the 4th quartile of the distribution of 
the number of relationships) and for ﬁ  rms with few relationships (below the 1st quartile of the same 
distribution). As shown in Table 2, interest rates paid by these two groups of ﬁ  rms are indeed different. 
Firms with fewer relationships pay, on average, higher interest rates. We also performed these tests 
for the four size categories. For both micro and small ﬁ  rms, interest rates are statistically higher for 
ﬁ  rms with fewer relationships. For medium-sized ﬁ  rms, the mean comparison tests suggest that there 
are no signiﬁ  cant differences in interest rates for ﬁ  rms in the 1st and 4th quartiles of the distribution of 
the number of relationships. Finally, for large ﬁ  rms, interest rates are signiﬁ  cantly higher with many 
bank relationships.
Chart 3
NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS AND 
IMPLICIT BANK INTEREST RATE
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The implicit interest rate was computed as the amount of interest 
paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the 
end of the year. The implicit spread on banks loans was deﬁ  ned as the 
difference between the implicit interest rate and a money market interest 
rate (3-month Euribor). The number of bank relationships was computed 
as the number of different banks that were lending to a given ﬁ  rm at the 
end of each year.
Chart 4
NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS BY FIRM AGE
 
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The implicit spread on banks loans was deﬁ  ned as the difference 
between the implicit interest rate and a money market interest rate (3-month 
Euribor). The number of bank relationships was computed as the number 
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5. BANK RELATIONSHIPS AND BORROWING COSTS
The descriptive analysis performed in the previous section suggests that ﬁ  rms that have one or few 
lending relationships pay, on average, higher interest rates, especially if they are smaller ﬁ  rms. In 
this section, we perform a regression analysis and control for several ﬁ  rm characteristics that may 
inﬂ  uence interest paid on bank loans. For instance, it is reasonable to consider that proﬁ  tability, colla-
teral, leverage or the ﬁ  rm’s credit risk are taken into account by banks when pricing loans. We deﬁ  ne 
Turnover as sales and services as a percentage of the ﬁ  rm’s assets. Firms with higher turnover are 
able to generate larger cash-ﬂ  ows with their activity and may face lower funding costs. Next we deﬁ  ne 
Tangible assets as % of debt to proxy for collateral. Leverage is deﬁ  ned as debt over assets to control 
Table 2




Number of bank 
relationships
Implicit bank 
interest rate Average 
interest rate for 




for ﬁ  rms 
with many 
relationships(a)
Mean comparison test 
Ho: diff = 0
Mean Median Mean Median diff t-ratio
Pr( |T| > 
|t| )
Micro 3 780 2.0 2.0 9.1 8.2 9.2 8.8 0.42 2.59 0.01
Small 7 836 3.1 3.0 8.2 7.2 8.4 8.0 0.36 3.59 0.00
Medium 4 204 4.7 4.0 7.2 6.3 7.3 7.2 0.08 0.59 0.55
Large 984 6.7 6.0 6.8 6.0 6.6 7.5 -0.90 -3.16 0.00
Total 16 804 3.5 3.0 8.1 7.1 8.7 7.5 1.26 16.11 0.00
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: (a) Firms with few relationships were deﬁ  ned as those included in the ﬁ  rst quartile of the distribution of the number of relationships. In turn, ﬁ  rms with 
many relationships were considered to be those in the fourth quartile of the same distribution.
Table 1




Implicit bank interest rates Age Number of employees
Obs. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 3 028 8.8 7.9 15.6 12 22 9
2 3 917 8.5 7.4 17.7 14 31 15
3 3 202 8.1 7.1 20.1 16 48 21
4 2 387 7.7 6.8 22.6 18 71 33
5 1 599 7.6 6.7 22.7 19 107 43
6 1 039 7.4 6.5 25.2 20 135 65
7 676 7.3 6.3 26.1 21 141 76
8 378 7.5 6.5 27.0 24 182 108
9 247 7.2 6.5 29.2 24 214 118
10 136 7.5 6.6 33.6 28 296 185
11 78 7.5 6.7 37.1 30 269 202
12 39 7.2 6.5 34.2 30 459 219
13 31 8.3 7.2 38.6 30 506 395
14 13 8.7 8.0 31.5 26 743 577
15 11 8.6 9.1 48.4 55 983 828
Total 16 804 8.1 20.5 71
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. 
The number of relationships was computed as the number of different banks that were lending to a given ﬁ  rm at the end of each year. To ease the reading of 
the table we exclude ﬁ  rms with more than 15 relationships.Articles  |  Part II
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for the inﬂ  uence of the outstanding debt on the interest rate. Credit risk is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one whenever the ﬁ  rm is in default at the end of the year. Debt coverage, calculated as 
net proﬁ  ts over debt to credit institutions, is another measure of the ﬁ  rm’s ﬁ  nancial health. We also 
include size measured by Assets and the Age of the ﬁ  rm, the latter measured as the number of years 
since a ﬁ  rm’s inception.5 In the regressions, all ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c variables are lagged by one year, moti-
vated by the fact that banks can only observe the previous year balance sheet when negotiating the 
loan. Moreover, this choice mitigates potential concerns of endogeneity biases due to simultaneity 
issues. Table 3 reports summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables.
The sample period corresponds to a time of structural changes in the Portuguese banking sector as 
well as to the period of convergence that led to the European Monetary Union participation. These 
developments contributed to the steady downward trend seen in money market interest rates during 
this period. At the same time the Portuguese economy went through a full business cycle. To capture 
all these time effects we include in the regressions a set of time dummies and, in a different speciﬁ  -
cation, the 3-month Euribor, the total number of banks granting credit in each year and GDP growth.
We estimate the following ﬁ  xed-effects model:
1
r
i t i i ti ti t t i t rn X X Z u αδ β ϕ γ − =+ + + + +
where 
it r is the interest rate, 
r
it n is the number of bank relationships, 
it X and 
1 it X − are vectors of 
contemporaneous and lagged ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c variables,6 and 
t Z is a vector of time-varying variables. 
In Table 4 we present our main econometric results. We begin by regressing the interest rate on the 
number of bank relationships and time dummies with ﬁ  rm ﬁ  xed-effects. The results are shown in the 
ﬁ  rst column of Table 4. The coefﬁ  cient on the Number of bank relationships is -0.142 with a t-statistic 
(5)  Age deﬁ  ned as log(1+age).
(6)  The only contemporaneous ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c variable considered is ﬁ  rm age.
Table 3
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
N Mean Std dev Min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 Max Skewness Kurtosis
Implicit bank 
interest rate 16 804 8.1 3.9 2.1 3.5 5.2 7.1 10.1 16.4 21.2 1.1 3.8
Number of bank 
relationships 16 804 3.5 2.3 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 8.0 25.0 1.6 8.1
Turnover 16 804 126.5 79.2 0.7 30.5 74.7 111.6 158.9 276.2 603 1.7 7.5
Tangible assets as 
a % of debt 16 804 49.5 42.9 0.2 2.8 16.4 39.6 70.7 132.8 286 1.5 5.9
Leverage 16 804 74.5 21.4 9.0 43.2 62.7 74.3 84.9 101.6 454 2.4 25.0
Credit risk 16 774 0.04 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 4.6 22.5
Debt coverage 16 804 8.0 43.5 -257 -44.4 0.2 3.7 14.5 70.8 322 0.9 15.9
Firm age 16 804 20.5 16.7 0.0 4.0 10.0 16.0 25.0 55.0 248.0 2.3 10.9
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The implicit interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total debt to credit institutions at the end of 
the year. The number of bank relationships was computed as the number of different banks that were lending to a given ﬁ  rm at the end of each year. Turnover 
represents sales and services over assets; leverage is deﬁ  ned as debt over assets; credit risk is a dummy variable that takes the value one when the ﬁ  rm is 
in default; and debt coverage is deﬁ  ned as net proﬁ  ts over debt to credit institutions. Part II  |  Articles
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Table 4
REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent variable: Implicit bank interest rate
Fixed-effect regressions












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Number of bank relationshipst -0.142 -0.196 -0.172 - -0.259 -0.185 -0.120 -0.230 -0.236 -0.192
-5.51 -4.96 -4.34 - -1.31 -2.51 -1.80 -2.27 -2.88 -4.04
Ln(number of bank relationships+1)t - - - -0.857 - - ----
- - - -4.16 - - - - - -
Turnovert-1 - -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003
- -2.28 -2.21 -2.30 -2.30 -0.52 0.88 -0.27 -2.25 -1.64
Tangible assets as % of debtt-1 - -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 -0.007 -0.006
- -2.84 -3.05 -2.87 0.04 -2.13 -1.95 -0.07 -1.45 -1.89
Leveraget-1 - 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.007 0.013 0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.009
- 0.68 0.86 0.63 -0.77 1.53 0.60 -0.14 0.37 1.24
Credit riskt-1 - 0.492 0.520 0.496 0.432 0.905 0.042 0.075 0.384 0.576
- 2.23 2.32 2.25 0.70 2.32 0.11 0.14 0.95 2.05
Debt coveraget-1 - -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 -0.007
- -2.73 -2.45 -2.73 -0.72 -1.41 -2.01 -0.92 -0.31 -3.57
Firm aget - -0.076 -2.887 -0.136 0.735 -0.569 1.076 2.652 - -
- -0.17 -7.69 -0.31 0.54 -0.83 1.09 1.23 - -
Assetst-1 - -0.521 0.933 -0.459 -6.762 4.026 -9.423 5.792 -0.196 -2.593
- -0.36 0.63 -0.32 -1.31 1.12 -1.61 0.64 -0.08 -1.09
Assets2
t-1 - 0.035 -0.030 0.032 0.275 -0.109 0.318 -0.141 0.032 0.095
- 0.70 -0.60 0.65 1.37 -0.86 1.73 -0.54 0.36 1.22
3-month Euribort - - 0.543 - - - ----
- - 9.16 -------
Number of bankst - - -0.035 - - - ----
- - -9.04 -------
GDP growtht - - 0.014 - - - ----
- - 0.51 -------
Constant 13.764 13.453 15.123 13.789 54.291 -21.218 77.407 -53.848 9.993 29.665
116.22 1.26 1.40 1.30 1.60 -0.83 1.65 -0.69 0.57 1.64
Year dummies Y Y N Y YYYYYY
Number of observations 38 764 16 804 16 804 16 804 3 780 7 836 4 204 984 7 584 9 220
Number of ﬁ  rms 16 014 7700 7 700 7 700 2 174 3 822 1875 435 4 043 4 115
R2 within 0.268 0.186 0.160 0.186 0.122 0.198 0.234 0.174 0.159 0.197
R2 between 0.265 0.094 0.073 0.098 0.037 0.084 0.132 0.037 0.037 0.171
R2 overall 0.259 0.102 0.077 0.105 0.042 0.093 0.134 0.026 0.044 0.163
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: t-statistics in italics (using robust standard errors). The implicit interest rate was computed using data from the Central Balance Sheet Database, which includes detailed 
accounting information for a large sample of Portuguese companies. This interest rate was computed as the amount of interest paid on bank loans as a percentage of total 
debt to credit institutions at the end of the year. The number of bank relationships was computed using information from the Central Register of Banco de Portugal, by counting 
the number of different banks that were lending to a given ﬁ  rm at the end of each year. Turnover represents sales and services over assets; leverage is deﬁ  ned as debt over 
assets; credit risk is a dummy variable that takes the value one when the ﬁ  rm is in default; and debt coverage is deﬁ  ned as net proﬁ  ts over debt to credit institutions. Firm age 
deﬁ  ned as log(age+1). The deﬁ  nition of ﬁ  rm size was based on the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC), by taking into account the number 
of employees and sales volume. Young ﬁ  rms deﬁ  ned as those created within the last 14 years and mature ﬁ  rms deﬁ  ned as those with more than 14 years. All regressions were 
estimated using year dummies, except for the regression in column (3).Articles  |  Part II
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of -5.51. On average one additional bank relationship decreases the interest rate by 14 bps7. This 
result is consistent with the predictions of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992), for instance.
In column 2 we control for the ﬁ  rm characteristics, including Turnover, Tangible assets as % of debt, 
Leverage, Credit risk, Debt coverage, Firm age, Assets and (Assets²). The number of observations 
drops by approximately half in this speciﬁ  cation due to the inclusion of the lagged variables. All 
coefﬁ  cients show up with the expected sign when statistically signiﬁ  cant. Turnover, Tangible assets 
as % of debt and Debt coverage reduce interest rates, while Credit risk has the opposite effect. The 
coefﬁ  cients on Leverage, Assets, (Assets)² and Age are not statistically signiﬁ  cant at a 5% level. 
The coefﬁ  cient of the Number of bank relationships is similar to the previous regression without the 
ﬁ  rm controls: one additional relationship should decrease interest rates by 20 bps. The time dum-
mies are highly signiﬁ  cant, suggesting that it is important to control for macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
  developments.
In column 3, we include macroeconomic variables instead of the time dummies: the 3-month Euri-
bor, the Total number of banks granting credit in each year and GDP growth. The coefﬁ  cient of the 
3-month Euribor is signiﬁ  cant and positive as expected. We control for the total number of banks 
because there were entries, exits, mergers, and acquisitions in the banking sector during this period. 
The number of banks can also serve as a proxy for the overall competition level in the credit market. 
The coefﬁ  cient of the Total number of banks is negative and signiﬁ  cant. Finally GDP growth is not 
statistically signiﬁ  cant. The coefﬁ  cient of the number of bank relationships decreases slightly in this 
speciﬁ  cation to 17 bps.
However, it is likely that the negative effect of number of bank relationships on interest rates is not 
linear. In other words, we would expect that the marginal beneﬁ  t of holding bank relationships is de-
creasing. In order to test this, we consider the variable ln(Number of bank relationships + 1) instead 
of using simply the Number of bank relationships. As shown in column 4, this variable is signiﬁ  cant 
and has a negative coefﬁ  cient, thereby giving some support to the possibility of non-linear effects on 
interest rates. Thus, the decrease in interest rates obtained with additional bank relationships should 
be more signiﬁ  cant for ﬁ  rms with a small number of relationships, as illustrated in Chart 5.
In order to better explore differences across ﬁ  rm size, we repeat the regression in column 2 for each 
size category. We ﬁ  nd that the Number of bank relationships decreases the cost of debt for all ﬁ  rm 
sizes, with the exception of micro ﬁ  rms, for which the coefﬁ  cient is not signiﬁ  cantly different from ze-
ro.8 The largest statistically signiﬁ  cant slope coefﬁ  cient is obtained for large ﬁ  rms: an additional bank 
relationship reduces the interest rate on average by 23 bps for large ﬁ  rms and by 19 and 12 bps for 
small and medium ﬁ  rms, respectively. The differences in economic and statistical signiﬁ  cance across 
ﬁ  rm sizes may reﬂ  ect asymmetric information issues, as informationally opaque (small and young) 
ﬁ  rms may beneﬁ  t more from having concentrated lending relationships. Moreover, this result should 
also derive from larger ﬁ  rms having more bargaining power in their relationships with banks.
(7)  In this speciﬁ  cation we consider all the observations in the sample after application of the ﬁ  lters mentioned in Section 3 and not only those with two 
consecutive years of data
(8)  In fact, most regressors are not signiﬁ  cant in explaining interest rates for micro ﬁ  rms. This may reﬂ  ect some discretionarity in loan pricing behavior for the 
smaller ﬁ  rms, as discussed by Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2007).Part II  |  Articles
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Firm age fails to be signiﬁ  cant in most of the regressions estimated, even though the descriptive 
analysis presented in the previous section seemed to give support to the existence of an age effect 
in interest rates. This age effect is documented by Kim, Kristiansen and Vale (2007), who ﬁ  nd that 
young ﬁ  rms beneﬁ  t initially from lower interest rates, as banks compete to attract them. Once they 
are locked-in, markups on interest rates increase. However, as ﬁ  rms get older and information asym-
metries become less severe, interest rate markups decrease again. To further explore if ﬁ  rm age 
affects the linkage between the number of bank relationships and interest rates, we estimate the 
same regression for two different age groups: younger ﬁ  rms that have an age lower than the median 
age in our sample (14 years), and more mature ﬁ  rms that are above the median age. The results are 
displayed in the last two columns of Table 4. On average one additional relationship for older ﬁ  rms 
signiﬁ  cantly decreases interest rates by 19 bps, whereas younger ﬁ  rms beneﬁ  t from a larger decrea-
se (24 bps). Nevertheless, ﬁ  rm age does not seem to be a main driver of the impact of the choice of 
the number of bank relationships on interest rates.
For robustness purposes, we consider a different measure of the number of bank relationships. In 
fact, loan pricing may be inﬂ  uenced not only by the number of banks the ﬁ  rm borrows from, but also 
by the way loan amounts are distributed across these relationships. For instance, a ﬁ  rm with three 
different bank relationships may obtain almost all its funding from one of these banks or may choose 
to divide its total bank debt in three equal parts. The importance of considering the concentration of 
lending relationships is discussed, for instance, by Ongena, Tumer-Alkan and Westernhagen (2007).
We deﬁ  ne Concentration in Lending (HHI) and construct it as a Herﬁ  ndahl Index of the value of loans 
from different banks at the ﬁ  rm level in order to control for the dispersion of borrowing, which is a 
feature not directly captured by the Number of Bank Relationships. This measure is similar, to some 
extent, to the weighted number of bank relationships.
Table 5 shows regression results with this alternative measure of the number of bank relationships. 
Chart 5
NON-LINEAR EFFECT OF THE NUMBER OF BANK 
RELATIONSHIPS ON INTEREST RATES




























Number of bank relationshipsArticles  |  Part II
Financial Stability Report May 2010  |  Banco de Portugal 165
Our earlier results are conﬁ  rmed by these regressions. When Concentration in Lending (HHI) incre-
ases, the cost of borrowing also increases. However, when we estimate the regressions for different 
ﬁ  rm size groups this result is statistically signiﬁ  cant only for large ﬁ  rms. If large ﬁ  rms concentrate all 
their lending in one bank, they face higher borrowing costs than if they diversify. For the remaining 
ﬁ  rms, what seems to matter most is the number of relationships, rather than how loan amounts are 
distributed across those relationships. 
In sum, each additional relationship enhances the outside option of the ﬁ  rm, increasing its bargaining 
power. This outside option exists as long as there is some relationship between a ﬁ  rm and a bank, 
even if the amounts involved are not very large.
Table 5
CONCENTRATION IN LENDING
Dependent variable: Implicit bank interest rate
Fixed-effect regressions
All ﬁ  rms Micro ﬁ  rms Small ﬁ  rms Medium 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Concentration in lending (HHI)t 0.871 1.059 0.663 0.347 4.689 1.138 0.844
2.94 1.28 1.53 0.59 3.22 2.29 2.12
Turnovert-1 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003
-2.30 -2.30 -0.56 0.84 -0.22 -2.29 -1.63
Tangible assets as % of debtt-1 -0.008 0.000 -0.009 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006
-2.91 0.04 -2.13 -1.96 -0.46 -1.46 -1.98
Leveraget-1 0.003 -0.008 0.012 0.005 -0.017 0.002 0.008
0.53 -0.79 1.49 0.52 -0.63 0.24 1.12
Credit riskt-1 0.485 0.379 0.909 0.047 -0.006 0.369 0.567
2.20 0.61 2.33 0.12 -0.01 0.92 2.01
Debt coveraget-1 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007
-2.66 -0.71 -1.34 -1.98 -1.29 -0.26 -3.49
Firm aget -0.209 0.689 -0.607 1.018 2.407 - -
-0.47 0.51 -0.88 1.04 1.13 - -
Assetst-1 -0.623 -6.528 4.058 -10.188 4.770 0.070 -2.993
-0.43 -1.28 1.12 -1.75 0.51 0.03 -1.25
Assets2
t-1 0.035 0.265 -0.113 0.340 -0.112 0.020 0.105
0.71 1.33 -0.89 1.86 -0.42 0.23 1.33
Constant 13.981 51.899 -21.710 83.433 -46.339 7.382 32.085
1.31 1.55 -0.84 1.79 -0.58 0.42 1.75
Number of observations 16 804 3 780 7 836 4 204 984 7 584 9 220
Number of ﬁ  rms 7 700 2 174 3 822 1 875 435 4 043 4 115
R2 within 0.185 0.122 0.197 0.233 0.191 0.158 0.194
R2 between 0.102 0.040 0.088 0.138 0.037 0.040 0.181
R2 overall 0.107 0.045 0.096 0.137 0.034 0.046 0.167
Sources: Banco de Portugal and authors’ calculations.
Notes: t-statistics in italics (using robust standard errors). Concentration in lending is a Herﬁ  ndahl index using bank shares at the ﬁ  rm level. All other variables 
are deﬁ  ned in Table 4. All regressions were estimated using year dummies.Part II  |  Articles
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we empirically study the impact of the choice of the number of bank relationships on 
ﬁ  rms’ borrowing costs. We observe that, on average, Portuguese ﬁ  rms usually borrow from three 
different banks. Moreover, we ﬁ  nd that, other things controlled for, when a ﬁ  rm initiates one additional 
relationship with a bank, its interest rate decreases signiﬁ  cantly, on average. This result is   consistent 
with the theoretical predictions of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992), as well as with   empirical   results 
found for other European countries (Degryse, Kim and Ongena, 2009). Further  more, we ﬁ  nd that 
this result holds for all ﬁ  rm sizes, with the exception of micro ﬁ  rms, for which the result obtained 
is not   statistically signiﬁ  cant. Larger ﬁ  rms are those that beneﬁ  t more from holding multiple bank 
relationships. These differences across ﬁ   rm size may reﬂ   ect asymmetric information issues, as 
  informationally opaque ﬁ   rms may beneﬁ   t more from having concentrated bank relationships. In 
  addition, larger ﬁ  rms should also have more bargaining power in their relationships with banks, what 
may also contribute to explain these results. In turn, we do not ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant evidence of differences 
between young and mature ﬁ  rms. Furthermore, we ﬁ  nd that the decrease in interest rates obtained 
with additional bank relationships is more signiﬁ  cant for ﬁ  rms with a small number of relationships.
To complement our analysis, we consider another measure of relationships: instead of using the 
number of bank relationships held by each ﬁ  rm, we consider how are loan amounts distributed across 
these relationships, using a Herﬁ  ndahl Index. We ﬁ  nd that when ﬁ  rms’ borrowing is more concentra-
ted, their borrowing costs increase. However, this result is signiﬁ  cant only for large ﬁ  rms.Articles  |  Part II
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